THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE CAR IN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA Assessing the Policy Options by MOHAMAD, Jamilah & KIGGUNDU, Amin T.
IATSS RESEARCH Vol.31 No.1, 2007  69
THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE CAR IN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA  – Assessing the Policy Options –  J. MOHAMAD, A. T. KIGGUNDU
THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE CAR IN KUALA LUMPUR, 
MALAYSIA
– Assessing the Policy Options –
 Jamilah MOHAMAD Amin T. KIGGUNDU 
 Professor Researcher
 Department of Geography Department of Geography  
 University of Malaya University of Malaya  
 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
(Received March 8, 2007)
1. INTRODUCTION
In many cities today, the private car has become 
an important and dominant mode of transport1-3. The 
increasing dominance of the private car as a mode of 
transport is due to inherent advantages associated with 
its use. The unrestricted freedom that car users enjoy is 
one important reason why many people wish to own a 
car. Whilst public transport modes necessitate the sharing 
of services with strangers, the private car affords privacy 
and comfort for its user. 
Additionally, the private car has become more pop-
ular and dominant than public transport because it is 
usually available when required, takes the user from door 
to door and can reach dispersed destinations. It is also 
worth noting that the private car has become a symbol of 
power, status and prestige. Furthermore, private cars en-
able drivers to offer free lifts to travellers, and expensive 
car models are often associated with wealth in society4. 
It is therefore not surprising that car ownership and use 
are widely perceived as both a sign of afﬂuence and in-
creasing personal wealth. 
According to Ohmae5, in countries that have 
reached USD3000 per capita GNP (income threshold), 
there is always a strong and steady demand for consumer 
goods such as refrigerators, colour TVs and relatively 
cheap motorcars. This, he says, was particularly the 
case in Japan when it reached the USD3000 income 
threshold. Ohmae further asserted that for the people 
below USD3000 per capita GNP, “between say, USD1500 
and USD3000, the emphasis is more on motorbikes; be-
low USD1500, it is more on bicycles”5. Ohmae ﬁnally 
noted that “at USD5000 income threshold, there is usu-
ally a need to construct modern and high-speed high-
ways, build up-to-date airports as well as the demand for 
high quality and posh cars”.
Rapid motorization thus became an important fea-
ture of many East Asian cities such as Bangkok, Manila, 
Seoul and Jakarta 6-8. Over the 1980-1990 period, the 
spectacular economic performance of the East Asian 
miracle economies such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia has 
created numerous employment opportunities, increased 
incomes and reduced poverty9-12. In Malaysia, for exam-
ple, since 1987, the economy has grown at an average 
of 8.5 per cent each year, making it one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world13-15. By early 1997, 
just before the Asian economic and ﬁnancial crises, un-
employment stood at 2.9 per cent and the poverty rate at 
8 per cent16. Malaysia’s recent rapid growth in car owner-
ship particularly in conurbations such as Kuala Lumpur 
offers evidence that rising incomes are the major driving 
force for car ownership. 
2. RISING CAR OWNERSHIP IN FEDERAL 
TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR
Kuala Lumpur, as Malaysia’s capital city, has enor-
mously beneﬁtted from the country’s rapid economic 
growth and development. The city is also one of the ma-
jor recipients of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Ma-
laysia and its contribution to the country’s GDP is quite 
substantial. In the period 1986-1991, Kuala Lumpur’s 
GDP grew at 7 to 12 per cent annually making it one of 
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the fastest-growing cities in Malaysia17,18. Between 1995 
and 2000, the GDP for Kuala Lumpur increased from 
USD 6045 million to USD 7419 million, an average an-
nual growth of 4.6 per cent19. In addition, the per capita 
GDP for Kuala Lumpur increased from USD 6514 in 
1995 to USD 8086 in 2000. In other words, the per capita 
GDP for the whole city increased by average of 6.1 per 
cent annually during 1995-2000. Such developments 
have contributed to the movement of people from other 
parts of Malaysia into the city to seek employment and a 
better quality of life.
The growth of population in Kuala Lumpur has 
been very rapid, especially during the period 1970-90, 
when the average annual growth rate was 4.3 per cent20. 
The net-migration rates also experienced a major increase 
over the period 1970-80. In 2000, the Federal Territory of 
Kuala Lumpur had the highest population density in Ma-
laysia with 1269.5 persons per square kilometre, followed 
by Selangor state with 524.8 persons per square kilome-
tre19. The total population of Kuala Lumpur increased 
from 1.21 million in 1990 to about 1.42 million in year 
2000. It has a total employment of about 0.84 million in 
2000 of which 83 per cent is in the tertiary sector.
Although Kuala Lumpur is not regarded as a mega-
city21 due to its relatively small size and population, there 
are clear indications that the city is rapidly expanding and 
developing into what McGee and Robinson22 have termed 
as a Mega-Urban Region, covering the whole of Klang 
Valley with an area of 284300 hectares, including towns 
such as Petaling Jaya, Shah Alam, Klang, Subang Jaya, 
Bangi and Selayang. Under Malaysia’s Vision 2020, 
which aimed to transform Malaysia into a developed 
nation by the year 2020, many new areas have been 
identiﬁed and developed to reposition Kuala Lumpur to 
effectively compete with other cities such as Bangkok, 
Singapore, Jakarta and Manila for a favoured position 
within the global economy 17, 18. Examples of projects 
that have been implemented include the Federal Govern-
ment Administrative Centre of Putrajaya, Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport (KLIA), Kuala Lumpur City Centre 
(KLCC) and Kuala Lumpur Sentral Station (KLSS).
The new Federal Government Administrative 
Centre of Putrajaya is situated in the Multimedia Super 
Corridor (MSC). The MSC was designed and launched to 
serve as a catalyst for the development of the information 
technology (IT) sector in Malaysia and to help shift the 
Malaysian economy from its current input-output de-
velopment model based on manufacturing and primary 
commodities towards a knowledge-based economy (K-
economy)19. When fully completed, Putrajaya is expect-
ed to accommodate 76,000 government employees. 
Additionally, an important decision was taken by 
the Federal Government to transfer Malaysia’s main in-
ternational airport from Subang to Sepang. At Sepang, 
about an hour’s drive away, a new world-class airport, the 
Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) was built at 
a cost of USD 2.63 billion. In short, the move to build a 
new airport away from the city centre of Kuala Lumpur 
as well as the development of Putrajaya about 30 km 
away was intended to ease trafﬁc congestion in the city 
centre. However, these new developments are expected to 
attract more people into the mega-urban region of Kuala 
Lumpur, and spread out trafﬁc over a wider region. 
As the most important city in Malaysia, the Federal 
Territory of Kuala Lumpur continues to be ﬂooded with 
newly-registered motor vehicles each year. The Federal 
Territory’s percentage share of the newly-registered mo-
tor vehicles in the whole of Malaysia was 20.88 in 1991, 
19.11 (1993), 19.59 (1994), 24.24 (1995), 27.12 (1996), 
28.01 (1997), 19.13 (1998), 24.71 (1999), 24.96 (2000), 
25.08 (2001) and 26.94 (2002). Its annual percentage 
share plummeted to 19.13 in 1998 especially after the 
1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis that badly affected car demand 
in Malaysia. Recently however, Kuala Lumpur’s percent-
age share of the total new registered motor vehicles annu-
ally in Malaysia has been going up again in tandem with 
Malaysia’s gradual economic recovery. 
Table 1 shows the number of vehicles registered 
in Kuala Lumpur over the period 1983-2004. The table 
shows spectacular increases in growth rates of motor ve-
hicle registered except during/immediately after reces-
sion periods such as 1986-1988 and 1997. It is clear that 
the rapidly-expanding car market in the Federal Territory 
of Kuala Lumpur and other parts of the Klang Valley is a 
direct product of the spectacular economic performance 
of these areas and the huge economic role such areas play 
to the general development of Malaysia (Table 1).
It is further observed that in 1995 alone about 1.4 
million motor vehicles plied Kuala Lumpur city roads 
each working day, exceeding the city’s population of 1.3 
million. Additionally, “ the average number of vehicles 
entering the city, estimated at 740,000 daily, grew at an 
average annual rate of 17.5 percent during the Sixth Plan 
period [1991-1995] compared with 7.4 per cent during 
the Fifth Malaysia Plan period [1986-1990]” 23. Such 
developments will certainly require massive new invest-
ments in the city’s road sector as well as serious improve-
ments in the trafﬁc management aspects. The recent rapid 
economic transformation, the burgeoning population as 
well as the visible afﬂuence among its inhabitants have 
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collectively taken a heavy toll on the inadequate facilities 
and services that are provided by the authorities. 
It is reported that in 200724, 1.305 million vehicles 
cross the Middle Ring Road (MRRI) on a daily basis 
while 2.125 million vehicles cross the Middle Ring Road 
(MRRII) daily. Seventy percent of vehicular trips cross-
ing MRRI and MRRII (representing 42,600 vehicles 
and 86500 vehicles respectively) during the morning 
peak hour are single-occupancy vehicles (SOV). The 
daily vehicular trafﬁc at the CPA (Central Planning Area) 
boundary has increased by 1.7% pa (in vehicle units) and 
0.7% pa (in pcu) from 1985 to 1997, and by only 0.4% 
(in vehicle units) and 0.1% pa (in pcu) from 1997 to 2005. 
Compared to earlier forecast by the SMURT-KL Study25, 
the present trafﬁc volume entering the CPA boundary has 
already exceeded SMURT-KL forecast of 1,187,000 pcu/
day in 2010.
Aside from the income factor, the recent rapid 
growth in car ownership in the Kuala Lumpur mega-
urban region and Malaysia in general can be attributed to 
the existence of various car assembly facilities as well as 
the involvement of Malaysia into car manufacturing. 
Malaysia’s auto industry began in 1926 and by the end of 
1980, the industry had attracted 11 assemblers, which 
produced 25 makes of commercial and passenger vehi-
cles, 122 models and 212 variants. In 1984, “Malaysia 
had a person-to-car ratio of 1 to 20.8, which was second 
only to Singapore in the ASEAN region”26.
Malaysia had, in the early 1980s, embarked on var-
ious projects, which had been outlined in the country’s 
heavy industrialization program that had been drawn by 
the HICOM (the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malay-
sia) which had been set up in 1978. One such project was 
the plan to establish a national car manufacturing plant. 
In May 1983, together with the Japanese Mitsubishi 
Motor Company, the Malaysian Government established 
a car manufacturing company called the National Auto-
mobile Enterprise Co Ltd (Perusahaan Otomobil Nasi-
onal Bhd) or Proton as it is internationally known. In this 
joint-venture project, the Malaysian Government con-
tributed 70 per cent of the total paid-up capital of USD 50 
million while Mitsubishi Corporation and its afﬁliate, 
Mitsubishi Motor Corporation; each contributed 15 per 
cent27,28.
Proton started production in July 1985. The ﬁrst 
cars to be produced by Proton were named Saga and 105 
Sagas were produced each day in the ﬁrst year when the 
plant was running at 25 percent of installed capacity al-
though it was initially designed to produce 21.3 units per 
hour with a volume of 40,000 units per year on a single 
shift, or 120,000 cars a year over three shifts29. Since its 
debut in July 1985, Proton has moved to dominate, up 
until recently, the Malaysian automobile market and most 
of its cars are sold locally with a small percentage (less 
than 20 percent) being exported to a few countries. By 
exempting Proton from the high import duties, the gov-
ernment was able to offer its cars at a price that undercut 
imported vehicles. In addition, imported cars in Malaysia 
attract between 140 percent and 300 percent in taxes and 
imported car parts are charged 40 percent duty4. Such 
protectionist measures have strengthened Proton’s posi-
tion in the Malaysian domestic car market and have then 
contributed to the company’s viability, proﬁtability and 
survival. 
In the ﬁrst nine months of its debut, Proton sold 
7,500 units of cars and this constituted 11 percent of the 
Table 1 Number of motor vehicles registration (in '000s) in Federal Territory Kuala Lumpur 
and annual growth rate (1983-2004)
Year No. reg Growth Rate (%) Year No. reg Growth Rate (%)
1983 236.16 - 1994  848.75 15.05
1984 285.68 20.97 1995 1293.56 52.41
1985 327.60 14.67 1996 1465.92 13.32
1986 350.10  6.87 1997 1540.77  5.11
1987 368.73  5.32 1998 1857.06 20.53
1988 395.40  7.23 1999 2001.41  7.77
1989 443.80 12.24 2000 2158.18  7.83
1990 514.30 15.89 2001 2357.97  9.26
1991 599.66 16.60 2002 2550.00  8.14
1992 659.05  9.90 2003 2729.00  7.02
1993 737.75 11.94 2004 2966.21  8.69
Source: Road Transport Department, Federal Territory
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total market share of the passenger car market in Malay-
sia. Its share, however, surged to 73 percent in 1988 be-
fore falling to 62 percent in 1990 due to low domestic 
demand for cars. In 1993, Proton’s market share increased 
to 74 percent before falling again to about 64 percent in 
the period 1995-1998. It is also important to note, that 
while Proton’s domestic car market share has somewhat 
plummeted in recent years, this does not mean that the 
Malaysian Government’s measures and policies, which 
were deliberately instituted to protect its national car 
from other private car assemblers, are failing. 
In 1993, the Malaysian Government established 
another national car manufacturing company called 
Perodua (Perusahaan Otomobil Kedua Sdn Bhd) to 
strengthen its local auto industry before the commence-
ment of the ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) Free Trade Area (AFTA). The shareholders of 
Perodua consist of UMW Corporation Sdn Bhd (38 per-
cent), Daihatsu Motor Co Ltd of Japan (41 percent), 
Med-Bumikar Mara Sdn Bhd, PNB Equity Resource 
Corporation Sdn Bhd, Mitsui & Co. Ltd of Japan and 
Daihaitsu (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd30. Taken together, Proton 
and Perodua dominate much of the Malaysian car mar-
ket. The two car manufacturing companies have a total 
domestic car market share of about 90 per cent but re-
cently Perodua has eroded Proton’s market share in 
Malaysia. 
It is somewhat apparent that both Proton, as well as 
Perodua domestically-manufactured cars that were previ-
ously heavily protected by the Malaysian government 
have greatly contributed to the country’s recent rapid mo-
torization scenario. These locally-manufactured cars by 
the two national car manufacturers, which are affordable 
to many middle-class Malaysians, have contributed to the 
increasing number of single-occupancy vehicles and traf-
ﬁc congestion. 
The Federal government too, had through its minis-
tries, provided loans to civil servants to buy cars. The fact 
that the majority of locally-produced cars by the two na-
tional car manufacturers is domestically sold thus makes 
it untenable for the Government to promote policies that 
restrict car ownership. The Malaysian Government views 
its auto industry as a strategic sector that needs real sup-
port and protection. Rising car sales are also an important 
sign of positive and strong consumer sentiment which the 
Malaysian economy needs badly. More importantly, the 
car sector generates both tax and export revenues as well 
as employment and has a strong link with other industries 
such as steel, rubber, glass, oil and insurance. 
3. CONSEQUENCES OF RAPID MOTORIZATION
Since the early 1980s, the motorization process in 
Kuala Lumpur has been going on almost unhindered. 
While private cars and motorcycles have helped to im-
prove the mobility needs of many Asian cities, including 
Kuala Lumpur, there are valid reasons to worry about the 
rising trends of the single occupancy vehicles. One rea-
son is that as the number of single occupancy vehicles 
has risen, so has the need for ample and adequate road 
space especially in the Central Business District of cities 
such as Kuala Lumpur. For instance, between 1990 and 
1995, Malaysia as a whole experienced a 15 per cent de-
crease in kilometres of road per 10,000 vehicles. This 
decrease was particularly due “to higher rate of increase 
in vehicles, which grew by 41 per cent compared to 19 
per cent for roads”23.
An important challenge posed by the recent rapid 
motorization phenomenon in Kuala Lumpur is increasing 
trafﬁc congestion. Trafﬁc congestion is a major urban 
problem in many cities both in the developed and devel-
oping world. According to Lewis31, “Trafﬁc congestion 
is a direct result of increased trafﬁc ﬂow. The volume of 
trafﬁc on a link consists of a series of vehicles, the drivers 
of which each want to minimize their own journey time 
on the road. The speed and ﬂow of the trafﬁc is entirely 
dependent on the behaviour of each vehicle’s driver. Each 
vehicle’s progress therefore is necessarily dependent 
(except on an empty road) on how its driver adapts his or 
her behaviour to that of other drivers. Thus, congestion is 
primarily a function of personal behaviour and dynam-
ics”. In addition, trafﬁc congestion further induces acci-
dents and air pollution.
During peak-hour periods, the average trafﬁc ﬂow 
in the CBD of Kuala Lumpur is 28 km/h, compared with 
only 13 km/h in the Bangkok metropolitan region32. 
While Kuala Lumpur’s trafﬁc ﬂow conditions have not 
reached a critical level, the city’s uncontrolled motoriza-
tion process, the burgeoning population as well the lim-
ited ability to increase supply of physical resources such 
as roads and parking facilities especially in the CBD may 
help create a trafﬁc situation similar to that of Bangkok.
Rapid motorization also has an effect on public 
transport use in Kuala Lumpur. Presently, there are about 
4 major private companies operating approximately 
15000 bus trips per day. Taxis in Kuala Lumpur are oper-
ated by different taxi service operators. Currently, there 
are about 24,721 taxis licensed in Kuala Lumpur, run by 
4,183 operators. Rail services have become signiﬁcant 
since the implementation of two Light Rail Transit Sys-
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Table 2  Average route travel speed 
No. Route Average Route Travel Speed (km/h)
Inbound Outbound
A.M. Peak A.M. Peak
1986 1997 1986 1997
 1. Inner Ring Road 26.7 15.0 21.2 17.3
 2. Middle Ring Road 23.6 17.1 33.4 13.6
 3. Jln Ipoh, Jln Kuching 32.3 35.6 25.5 67.3
 4. Jln. Kepong, Jln Ipoh 25.6 19.3 17.2 28.2
 5. Karak Highway, Jln. Sentul 23.7 26.4 37.0 45.0
 6. Jln.Gombak, Jln. Pahang 10.3 12.4 36.6 27.0
 7. Jln. Ampang 19.5 10.4 24.9 19.5
 8. Jln.Cheras, Jln Pudu 15.8 14.0 34.8 22.8
 9. Seremban Highway 38.8 20.3 68.7 60.6
10. Federal Highway II 39.9 21.7 45.7 26.9
11. Jln. Pantai 24.3 13.4 32.7 19.6
Source: SMURT-KL STUDY, 1998
tems, ie. STAR and PUTRA. Together they provide 56 
km of rail network with 49 stations. In 2000, the STAR 
LRT on average handled 77,803 passengers per day while 
PUTRA LRT handled 121,950 passengers per day in the 
same year33. 
In November 2004, a government-owned opera-
tor RapidKL began operation. RapidKL (Rangkaian 
Pengangkutan Integrasi Deras) operates Klang Valley’s 
two LRT lines – renamed Putraline and Starline, as well 
as 107 bus routes. They make up about 65 percent of the 
public transportation in the Klang Valley. In addition to 
the LRT, the Kuala Lumpur monorail system serves down-
town Kuala Lumpur with its 8.6 km route with 11 stations. 
Meanwhile, KTM Komuter Trains ply along 153 km of 
tracks with 40 stations connecting  Kuala Lumpur to out-
lying townships within a 50 km radius, namely to Rawa-
ng and Seremban, and between Sentul and Port Klang. In 
addition, Express Rail Link (ERL) provides two rail ser-
vices, the KLIA Express and KLIA Transit servicing the 
Multimedia Super Corridor. In 2003, Starline had a daily 
passenger ridership of 94,480, Putraline 150,494, ERL 
6,014 and KL Monorail 27,00023 respectively.
Kuala Lumpur has one of the lowest public trans-
port passenger levels in Asia due in part to the rising lev-
els of private car ownership and use. The recently-launched 
Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 202034 revealed that public 
transport accounted for only 20 percent of total Kuala 
Lumpur passenger movements compared to 80 percent 
for private transport. Obviously, such developments are 
not good for the urban poor who cannot afford cars and 
who badly need accessible, affordable and reliable trans-
port to access distant places with abundant employment 
opportunities. 
The modal split for person trips at MRR1 using 
private transport (car/taxi/motorcycle) is 54.3% (in 
1985), 64.1% (1997) and 61.1% (2005) while the share 
of public transport (bus and, later, rail in 1997) is 37.4% 
in 1985, 25.1% in 1997 and 28.6% in 2005 respectively. 
Only 20% of Kuala Lumpur is within the transit corri-
dor (i.e. areas within 400 m on each side of a rail line).
Aside from the above challenges, rapid motoriza-
tion is also responsible for the increasing air pollution, 
car accidents and the unpleasant noise in Kuala Lumpur. 
Between 1990 and 2000, the number of reported car ac-
cidents in Kuala Lumpur increased by 92.9 per cent from 
19,365 to 33,735. Table 3 shows the number of accidents 
Table 3   Total road accidents in Kuala Lumpur, 1987-1996
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total No. of Accidents 20,104 18,728 16,068 19,365 22,800 24,697 27,000 27,439 27,939 33,375
CASUALTIES
DEATH 203 210 249 265 298 287 350 323 396
INJURY 2,958 2,699 3,192 3,712 3,875 4,473 4,444 4,697 4,350
Source: Compiled from the Ministry of Transport Yearbooks
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which involved deaths and injuries in Kuala Lumpur for 
the years 1987-1996. In Kuala Lumpur, 52% of the total 
number of fatal /serious accidents caused by vehicles, 
were caused by motorcycles, 30% private cars, 10% lor-
ries/vans, 3% buses and 2% taxis respectively. 
Turning to the issue of air pollution, motor vehicles 
have been blamed for the high levels of suspended par-
ticulate matter (SPM) in the air. According to Pendakur 
(1995)21, in 1989, the estimated 2.8 million vehicles in 
Kuala Lumpur released about  3700 tons of SPM in the 
air. According to the SMURT-KL Study25, in 1997, there 
is a problem with the ambient air quality in Kuala Lumpur 
with unfavourable conditions prevailing at busy trafﬁc 
crossings. Daily NO2 at Pudu and Cheng Lock crossings 
exceeded WHO guidelines (0.15 mg/m3 or 73 ppb) and 
8-hour measurement of CO at busy crossings showed 
values over the Malaysian guidelines. Extensive use of 
private vehicles in Kuala Lumpur has also affected visi-
bility and increased the incidence of asthma, conjunctivi-
tis and other diseases21. 
4. TRANSPORT DEMAND MANAGEMENT 
MEASURES
Transport Demand Management (TDM) has been 
described as “the art of inﬂuencing traveler behavior for 
the purpose of reducing travel demand or redistributing 
travel demand in space and time”35. The initial sugges-
tions for implementing TDM measures in Kuala Lumpur 
started with the Urban Transport Policy and Planning 
Study undertaken in 197336. The recommendations put 
forward by its consultants included deﬁning and preserv-
ing rights-of-way for short- and long-term improvements 
for public transport, eliminating extensive parking provi-
sion in the core area and improving the Kuala Lumpur 
Central Area Trafﬁc Circulation system. 
The Area Licensing Scheme was also adopted as 
one of the components of the Second Urban Transport 
Table 4 Area road pricing initiatives in Kuala Lumpur
Year Study Recommendations
1976 World Bank-ﬁnanced Second KL Urban Transport Project proposed Area Road Licensing similar to scheme in Singapore 
(High Occupancy Vehicle – HOV) exemption with cordon pricing 
1987 Klang Valley Transport Study by JICA proposed Cordon Charge on passenger cars with less than 4 persons travelling 
into the Central Area within the IRR in morning peak hours (HOV Exemption with Cordon Pricing) 
1997 SMURT-KL Study by JICA proposed Overall Area Pricing in the CBD whereby charges are applied to all cars using 
congested arterial road segments during peak periods
2007 KL Local Plan Study proposed Area Road Pricing Zone with Congestion Charging on 14 designated congested arterial 
roads in the CBD
Source: City Hall 2007
Project37. The key concept underlying the area licensing 
scheme is that a special, supplementary license must be 
obtained and displayed if a motorist wishes to enter a 
designated restricted area within which congestion is to 
be reduced. The intent of this scheme is that a signiﬁcant 
number of motorists would be discouraged from using 
their private vehicles for the journey to work in the morn-
ing peak period. 
The Kuala Lumpur Master Plan Transportation 
Study 1981 report38 also presented short-term proposals 
for bus transport improvements and proposals for contin-
ued investigations into the Light Rail Transit system. In 
order to complement the selected Kuala Lumpur Struc-
ture Plan strategy, new roads and road improvements 
were also recommended to provide accessibility to the 
new growth centres. Bus services were to be developed 
with maximum penetration into these growth areas and 
would be the principal means of internal circulation as 
well as serving an important feeder role to the chosen 
Rail Transit System. 
Other than the proposals for the LRT system, the 
study viewed that the need for trafﬁc limitation policies 
in Kuala Lumpur has not diminished since the previous 
study in 1973. The team outlined a possible trafﬁc re-
straint policy for Kuala Lumpur consisting of four instru-
ments of control. They were designed to limit the use of 
certain streets, for all or part of the day, for buses and 
high-occupancy vehicles only; control the car park pric-
ing structure; control the supply of parking in the heav-
ily-congested commercial core, and the implementation 
of an earlier proposal for the imposition of a charge for 
motorists who enter the Central Area during the morning 
peak period.  
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
also completed another study in 1997 aimed at achieving 
integrated urban transport strategies with the objectives 
of environmental improvement in Kuala Lumpur25. The 
various TDM measures include trafﬁc constraints and 
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area licensing. Following the results of the study, City 
Hall had planned to implement  are area licensing system 
in the CBD. This attempt was, however, abruptly sus-
pended due to the insufﬁcient public transport system at 
that time. 
Recently, the KL Local Plan recommended that 
congestion charging be implemented after a detailed feasi-
bility study was carried out by City Hall Kuala Lumpur24. 
The Local Plan recommended that implementation of 
congestion charging is to be undertaken after the public 
transport network and systems are comprehensively in 
place and working efﬁciently.
5. ASSESSING PRESENT AND FUTURE 
POLICY OPTIONS
One of the earliest options adopted in Kuala Lumpur 
has been the policy of building new motorways and toll 
expressways. It is, however, imperative to note that the 
strategy has somewhat failed to achieve its intended ob-
jective of curbing trafﬁc congestion in Kuala Lumpur. 
Many major roads leading to the city centre are still expe-
riencing trafﬁc congestion especially during peak hours. 
Highway construction in Kuala Lumpur has not 
only proved to be too costly but also environmentally and 
socially inimical39. The ever increasing demand for mo-
bility had prompted builders to build highways traversing 
densely-populated areas. Many houses have thus been 
demolished resulting in many families being displaced 
and uprooted. The noise generated by the vehicles using 
the new highways has become unbearable for the resi-
dents of the affected areas Meanwhile, the Federal Gov-
ernment has had to compensate highway concessionaires 
whose toll highways have failed to achieve the forecasted 
trafﬁc volumes. Between January and June 2002, the 
Government had spent about USD184.2 million to com-
pensate highway concessionaires for their loss of revenue 
due to lower toll rates40. If the current policy of compen-
sating highway concessionaires continues, the Govern-
ment will be expected to pay about USD5 billion to 
various concessionaires over the next 20 years. 
Experience from the highly-motorized countries 
such as the UK and US show that road construction alone 
is not sufﬁcient to solve trafﬁc congestion in cities and 
that other policy measures such as high parking charges, 
strict enforcement of parking and trafﬁc regulations, pub-
lic transport development and high fuel taxes are equally 
important41-43. In addition, there is a general agreement 
among practitioners and academics that emphasis on road 
construction only attracts more private vehicles.
Turning to the issue of public transport develop-
ment, it is important to mention that while many projects 
have been implemented to improve the sector, there are 
certain policy lacunas that need to be bridged before an 
efﬁcient, reliable, convenient and sustainable public 
transport system can be established in Kuala Lumpur. 
One such lacuna is the failure to control the rising trend 
of private car ownership, which has badly affected the 
performance, efﬁciency and viability of public transport. 
While the undeclared ofﬁcial policy has been not to dis-
courage private car ownership and use without a well de-
veloped public transport system in place, experience 
from some Asian cities such as Singapore, Hong Kong 
and Seoul show that the motorization process was ﬁrst 
restrained when there was no high quality, technologi-
cally sophisticated and high capacity light rail transit or 
mass rail transit systems. 
Since the mid-1990s, however, there have been 
various attempts in Kuala Lumpur to introduce a set of 
new trafﬁc management policy measures such as park-
and-ride, one-way streets and the introduction of bus 
lanes. An obvious example is the park-and-ride facilities 
that are provided near some LRT stations to encourage 
car users to use the LRT systems. Attempts to increase 
parking charges have largely failed as free parking spaces 
are quite pervasive in many parts of the city. The easy 
availability of parking spaces in Kuala Lumpur is due to 
two factors, ﬁrst, the opposition faced by the city’s trans-
port planners from businessmen; and secondly, the lack 
of strict enforcement of parking and trafﬁc regulations in 
the city. 
Thus, in Kuala Lumpur, no real progress has been 
made towards implementing the Area Licensing Scheme 
(ALS) proposed37. In November 1978, thirteen steel 
gantries (entry gateways) were erected by City Hall as a 
preparation for implementing the ALS. However, a 
Cabinet decision in May 1979 decided to reject the pro-
posal based upon three considerations. Firstly, the public 
transport supply was considered inadequate to cater for 
the increased demand anticipated as a result of the intro-
duction of the scheme. Secondly, City Hall had not pro-
vided adequate park-and-ride facilities for private car 
commuters wishing to transfer to public transport use. 
Thirdly, there was no provision then of an alternative 
route, outside the ALS boundary, to take through trafﬁc 
without needing to cross the CBD.
From the above discussion, it is clear that the strate-
gies employed to alleviate trafﬁc congestion in the Kuala 
Lumpur conurbation have not worked and that a new ap-
proach is needed to overcome the problem. To be practi-
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cal and sustainable, the new approach should not only 
focus at improving trafﬁc ﬂow (especially through high-
way construction) but also implementing measures that 
may seem politically unpopular. Some of these measures 
(for example a congestion charging scheme, high auto 
and fuel taxes, high parking charges and strict parking 
controls) have been recommended before in various 
transport studies that were undertaken in Kuala Lumpur 
but failed to be implemented due to lack of political will 
and opposition from both the ‘car owning lobby’ as well 
as the business community28. 
There is also a consensus among Malaysian policy-
makers and transport watchers, that plans to establish ef-
ﬁcient public transport should precede efforts that aim to 
control automobile use in the city. Such agreement and 
beliefs are however refuted by Barter44 who argues that 
delaying or postponing car restraint measures is not 
prudent and may jeopardise or complicate future plans to 
implement the same measures when the majority of 
travellers have become used to private transport. There 
are examples of cities that have managed to establish 
efﬁcient and congestion-free transport systems whereby 
car restraint measures preceded heavy and massive in-
vestment in high capacity and sophisticated systems such 
as mass rail transit (MRT) or light rail transit (LRT) sys-
tems. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main conclusion to be drawn in this paper is 
that private car ownership and use have not been re-
strained or controlled in Kuala Lumpur. Unless deliber-
ate and tough policies are instituted to discourage car 
ownership and usage, like in Singapore, Tokyo and Seoul 
which is still difﬁcult in many major cities because of the 
employment and revenue (both tax and export revenues) 
generated by the motorcar industry, the strong link that 
exists between the motorcar industry and other industries 
(such as steel, oil, rubber, and insurance), the increasing 
power and inﬂuence of the car lobby as well as the exist-
ing deﬁciencies in public transport, attempts to develop 
transport systems that are sustainable will continue to be 
an illusion.
There are critical success factors involved in deter-
mining the future of far-reaching TDM measures. Politi-
cally, as in the case of the Area Licensing Scheme, it was 
necessary to secure political acceptance and commitment 
at the highest levels (project champion) in order to achieve 
plan objectives. Secondly, there must be genuine public 
acceptance and ﬁnancial constraints must also be recog-
nized at the early stages of identifying possible transport 
options. Policy makers need to ensure that ﬁnance would 
be available for provision of selected transport facilities, 
and then, there is a need to ascertain the available spend-
ing power of the population to use facilities provided, 
especially in terms of fare levels. If ﬁnancial consider-
ations are not taken into account, proposals may take a 
long time to materialize.
This paper has illustrated the attempt by transport 
policy-makers in Kuala Lumpur to draw up some TDM 
measures towards improving the trafﬁc situation in Kuala 
Lumpur. It has shown that while the policies have been 
far-ranging, to date there has yet to be a singular success 
achieved with these measures. 
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